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Provider Response to Cost Containment:
Fraud & Abuse Issues
Introduction by Charisse Logarta

1. INTRODUCTION

Joan Polacheck is an accomplished partner in the Health Department at
McDermott, Will & Emery, L.L.P. Ms. Polacheck has vast experience in
general, corporate, and regulator\ health law. She represents health care
provideprovirovider networks, and suppliers on regulatory compliance
matters, focusing on health care fraud and abuse. Ms. Polacheck also
advises hospitals. hospital systems. health care vendors, and suppliers in
performing legal audits in the course of establishing and effectuating
compliance programs.
She adeptly aids her clients to develop and
implement provider networks and advises them on self-insurance and
captive insurance issues.
As a member of the Illinois Bar Association and the American Health
Lawyers Association, Ms. Polacheck speaks passionately on various topics
of health law for different groups within the health care industry. She
earned her Bachelor of Arts from Yale University, summa cum laude, and
her Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School, cum laude.
Ms. Polacheck spoke enthusiastically at Loyola University Chicago
School of Law's Annual Health Law and Policy Colloquium, Cost and
QualitY in Health Care: Does AnYone Get What They Pay For: Focusing
on health care providers' responses to government cost containment
initiatives, she addressed the tension between cost savings and quality of
care, as well as how the dispute over gainshaing practices enhances that
tension. She emphasized the effects of health care fraud and abuse laws and
how they may not only inadvertently prevent health care providers from
developing creative responses to cost containment, but also hinder the
delivery of high quality health care. The following analysis briefly
summarizes the major health care regulations and expands on how they
place pressure on health care providers' abilities to save costs without
. Student, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Class of 2007. Ms. Logarta
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sacrificing quality.
It then explains the ramifications of gainsharing
practices and how they affect the health care industry.
II.

FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS

Federal health care fraud and abuse laws address the containment of
government health costs, the balancing of the health care market, and the
protection of patients. In an effort to contain government costs in light of
the rising cost of health care, Congress enacted laws to monitor Medicare
and Medicaid payment mechanisms.
Specifically, the Anti-Kickback
Statute, the Stark Laws, the False Claims Act, and the Civil Monetary
Penalties Law all police provider responses to cost containment that
inappropriately maximize payment of government dollars.'
The federal Anti-Kickback Statute imposes criminal penalties for
soliciting, paying or receiving illegal remunerations, in return for referrals
of health care goods or services paid for, wholly or partially, under
Medicare or Medicaid programs . These penalties only apply to intentional
and improper attempts to save or earn money among health care providers
at the expense of patients or the government.3 The Stark Law, also known
as the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act, prohibits self-interested referrals of
health care services under Medicare (or Medicaid in some cases) to
institutions in which the referrer has a financial interest.4 Unlike the AntiKickback Statute, the Stark Law operates under strict liability and does not
require proof of intent for a violation.5 A significant provision of the False
Claims Act allows private parties, or "whistleblowers," to challenge and
recov er for fraud regarding health care paid for by the federal government.6
Lastly, the Civil Monetary Penalties Law imposes fines for certain
violations of health care fraud and abuse laws.' This law penalizes the
provision or receipt of incentives to reduce or limit medical services
without regard to whether the services are medically necessary, which
becomes problematic when providers try to contain costs. 8
Ms. Polacheck acknowledged the necessity of these laws for the

1. Joan Polacheck, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery, LLP, Address at the Loyola
University Chicago School of Law Institute for Health Law Fifth Annual Health Law and
Policy Colloquium (Nov. 10, 2005).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2003).
3.
§ 1320a-7b(b)
4. § 1395nn (2000).
5. Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding. and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U.
A', N SURV. AM. L. 241, 244 (2004).
6. See 31 U.S.C.§3730(2000).
7. Scc 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (2000).
8. § 1320a-7a(b) (2000).
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prevention of fraud on the government and for cost containment. 9
However, she recognized that these regulations may effectively prevent
providers and physicians from creatively keeping costs down while
maintaining quality of care.'°
III. COST CONTAINMENT VERSUS QUALITY OF CARE
The other side of the double-edged sword of fraud and abuse laws yields
a larger controversy with respect to provider responses to these laws.
Hospitals' goals of furnishing competitive and up-to-date medical care
naturally conflict with the goals of cost containment. For example, the
implementation of Medicare Part A Diagnosis Related Groupings
("DRGs") and the growth of managed care have placed mounting pressure
on hospitals to reduce costs."' Therefore, in order to comply with fraud and
abuse regulations, health care providers must creatively form arrangements
with physicians that balance their own cost-effectiveness with quality of
care.' 2 The question then arises: should providers use economic incentives
to encourage physicians to consider the cost-effectiveness of their
services,
3
and if so, how can they achieve this without violating the law?'
IV. GAINSHAR1NG

In the past, hospitals and providers created gainsharing arrangements to
deal with the dilemma that health care fraud and abuse laws pose.
Gainsharing in this setting usually refers to arrangements where a hospital
enjoys reduced costs attributable to physicians' efforts and then shares a
percentage of those savings with the physicians. 4 For example, under the
Medicare Prospective Payment System, a hospital receives a uniform preestablished payment for each patient under sets of DRGs, regardless of how
much expense each patient actually incurs.' 5 At the same time, Medicare
compensates physicians on a fee-for-service basis, which pays physicians
for each individual reimbursable service rendered.' 6 However, even though
a gainsharing attempt to align hospitals' and physicians' economic interests
by providing physicians with financial incentives to engage in cost-effective
9.

Polacheck, supra note 1.

10.

Id.

11.

Marcelo N. Corpuz, I1 & Celestina Owusu-Sanders, OIG Issues Advisory Opinions

on GainsharingArrangements,17 No. 3 HEALTH LAW 16, 16 (2005).

12.

Polacheck, supra note 1.

13. Richard S. Saver, Squandering the Gain: Gainsharingand the Continuing Dilemma
of PhysicianFinancialIncentives, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 150 (2003).

14.
15.
16.

Corpuz & Owusu-Sanders, supra note 11, at 16.
Saver, supra note 13, at 156.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-4(a) - j) (2000); Saver, supra note 13, at 157.
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care, this payment schedule actually creates incentives for physicians to
perform additional services. 17
Gainsharing arrangements have come under fire because of their
potential to violate fraud and abuse laws. The effectiveness and legality of
these arrangements present a quandary for the Health and Human Services
Office of the Inspector General (OIG). In 1999, the OIG issued a Special
Advisory Bulletin indicating that health care gainsharing violates laws that
prohibit "payments by or on behalf of a hospital to physicians with clinical
care responsibilities, directly or indirectly, to induce a reduction or
limitation of services to Medicare or Medicaid patients."' Yet the OIG
recently issued five opinions that did approve of specific gainsharing
arrangements involving cardiac catheterization and cardiac surgery
programs, even though they potentially violated the Anti-Kickback Statute
and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law.' 9 While these opinions only
considered very narrowly tailored programs that were carefully crafted with
safeguards against diminishing quality of care, they signify that hospitals
may have the option to legally implement particular gainsharing
arrangements. Still, the legal climate surrounding gainsharing remains
unclear and the dispute over such arrangements only increases the strain on
the tension between cost containment and quality of care.2 °
Gainsharing's strengths and weaknesses arguably leave the issue in a
stalemate. In 1986, the Government Accounting Office issued a report
identifying the main abuse risk of gainsharing as "the incentive for
physicians not to see, admit, or treat Medicare beneficiaries."
Such
arrangements may cause physicians to compromise quality of care given to
patients because of cost-efficient practices, creating a standard of care based
on provider finances rather than on the patients' best interests. 22 The OIG's
concerns highlight several dangers of gainsharing plans: encouraging
physicians to "cherry pick" (selecting healthier and less expensive patients),
promoting paid referrals, and creating unfair competition.23 Additionally,
17.

Betsy McCubrey, OIG Bulletin Highlights Schizophrenic Attitude in Cost-Saving

Measures." Gainsharing Arrangements - Their Histor, Use, and Future, 79 N.C.L. REv.

157, 166 (2000); Corpuz & Owusu-Sanders, supra note 11, at 16; Saver, supra note 13, at
157.

18. Gamshanng Arrangements and CMPs for Hospital Payments to Physicians to
Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,985 (July 14, 1999).
19. See Corpuz & Owusu-Sanders, supra note 11, at 16.
20. Polacheck, supra note 1.
21. McCubrey, supra note 17, at 174; see U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/HRD-86103, Medicare: Physician Incentive Payments by Hospitals Could Lead to Abuse 1, 3-4
(1986) (Sup. Docs. No. GA I.13:HRD-86-10).
22 See McCumbrey, supra note 17, at 175.
23. Corpuz & Owusu-Sanders, supra note 11, at 18.
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these arrangements can also prevent incentives to invest in new, more
expensive technology and treatments.
Alternatively, proponents of gainsharing emphasize improved quality of
services as one of its major strengths. 24 Under carefully structured
arrangements, providers may "condition payments to physicians on the
physicians' ability to maintain or achieve" specified higher standards2 5
Gainsharing also helps to align providers' and physicians' interests in
"lower[ing] hospital costs, improv[ing] operational efficiencies, and
establish[ing] procedures . ..that improve the overall quality of patient

care, - while still allowing physicians to maintain the flexibility and
autonomy necessary to individualize the care they provide.27
On October 7, 2005, the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health held
a hearing to address health care gainsharing issues. 28 At this hearing,
witnesses and panelists made statements before the Subcommittee
regarding the advantages and disadvantages of gainsharing arrangements.
The variance in opinions presented at this hearing illustrates the current
depth of the dispute and indicates that the views of gainsharing advocates
and opponents seem unlikely to converge within the near future. Ms.
Polacheck analyzed several statements from this hearing and clearly
depicted the many dimensions of this problematic issue.3 °
V. CONCLUSION

Increased government regulations in the health care industry seem to
create just as many problems as they attempt to address, if not more.
Health care providers face significant pressure to contain costs without
violating federal health care fraud and abuse laws. At the same time,
hospitals must depend on physicians to provide high quality and costefficient care for patients. Gainsharing arrangements arose as the logical
response to these needs, aligning the interests of providers and physicians.
Due to the limitations that fraud and abuse laws impose, these arrangements
became widely observed as illegal, but new opinions issued by the OIG
have again placed the issue on the table.
As shown in the transcript that follows, Ms. Joan Polacheck presented
24.

McCubrey, supra note 17, at 176.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 177-78.
28. Hearing on Gainsharing before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 109th Cong. (2005), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=
view&id= 4 67 1.

29.

Id.

30.

Polacheck, supra note 1.
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the complexities in this area with a keen knowledge of the tension between
health care fraud laws, cost containment, and quality of care. Focusing on
statements made at the October 7, 2005, hearing held by the Ways and
Means Committee on Health, she questioned the necessity of gainsharing
arrangements and their ability to ease this tension.
Ms. Polacheck
illustrated the cloudiness of the federal government's position on the
legality of gainsharing and warned that problems in this area may continue
to plague the health care and legal fields well into the future.
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